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Abstract. The issue of safe utilization of mobile devices is becoming an increasingly
important problem, among others due to the widespread use of such devices to
access sensitive data (such as electronic documents or banking data). In our work
we analyze the use of biometric techniques in order to secure a mobile device, with
particular emphasis on the viability of selected biometric characteristics. For this
purpose, we investigate the possibility of applying machine learning models to assess
the authenticity of a biometric characteristic. Results of our tests have shown that
the most effective method of assessing the viability of a biometric characteristic
involves blink and smile detection.
Keywords: Biometrics, viability of a biometric characteristic, face recognition,
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1 INTRODUCTION
Due to the widespread use of mobile devices, it is becoming more and more im-
portant to ensure their appropriate level of security. In particular, it is important
to protect the identity of the mobile device user, including protection of personal
information, banking data or other sensitive data. For this purpose, various secu-
rity methods have been developed over the years. The most common method of
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securing access to a mobile device is a 4-character PIN password. However, with
the ongoing technical progress (including machine learning methods, and, in par-
ticular, data processing by deep neural networks), biometric methods are more and
more frequently applied to secure access to mobile devices, including, primarily, the
facial recognition method. This method must work in real time; moreover, it should
work reliably in various environment conditions and despite changes in the appear-
ance of the face itself. Therefore, with the growing popularity of biometric methods
that provide high accuracy, scalability and system security, it becomes important to
ensure that the biometric characteristic used for authorization remains authentic.
The problem of assessing the viability of a biometric characteristic, making sure
that the characteristic comes from a real and physically present person, is complex
and not yet fully explored. Therefore, in our article, we focus on this issue and
examine the effectiveness of various methods of assessing the viability of biometric
characteristics.
The structure of the article is as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of re-
search in the field of detecting attacks on the credibility of a biometric characteristic;
Section 3 describes evaluation of methods of assessment of the viability of a biometric
characteristic; Section 4 presents the results of experiments and Section 5 contains
conclusions.
2 RELATED WORK
A biometric system should not only be able to correctly recognize the face, but
also be resistant to various types of attacks. The assessment of the viability of
a biometric characteristic consists in making sure that the characteristic considered
by the system comes from a real person who is physically present at the site of
the given activity. Due to the large variety of attacks, the problem of detecting
malicious access has not yet been fully resolved. The following types of attacks can
be distinguished:
1. static – using a printed or displayed target;
2. dynamic – using facial recording, often with changing perspective or expressions;
3. using 3D masks [5] – ranging from the simplest paper masks to very detailed
ones made of resin or silicone.
Given the wide range of potential attacks, many solutions have been devel-
oped to detect them. The focus was mostly on detecting only one type of attack.
Initially, hand-designed methods were used, such as LBP [18, 4] and its various
modifications [6, 24]. Recently, neural networks have been gaining popularity. They
perceive features of the image that are difficult to describe using simple algorithm.
There are many ways to detect an attack, differing mainly in the degree of inter-
action with the user. An ideal biometric system would be able to detect an attack
attempt in a very short time and without any user interaction. Unfortunately, such
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methods require additional sensors, which mobile devices are not always equipped
with.
The simplest solutions rely on a single photo showing the the user’s face and
make the appropriate classification by analyzing this image. Another group of solu-
tions is based on the analysis of a sequence of consecutive photos. We can distinguish
solutions based on unintentional facial or camera movements, and those that require
the user to perform the prescribed motion. The former group is not very invasive,
but it does not provide as much information as a forced interaction. By forcing
specific movement larger changes are produced between consecutive images; what is
more, an attack becomes more difficult to carry out. The following ways of recog-
nizing attacks can be distinguished: analyzing facial expression, analyzing the 3D
structure and mimicry of the face, and using image texture analysis.
Utilization of blinking as a simple method of assessing facial vitality was dis-
cussed in [11] and [21]. Furthermore, [8] presents a method of assessing vitality by
analyzing unintended eye movements and blinking. When eyes are detected, the
image is normalized and successive frames of the image sequence are compared. If
the differences are large enough, the characteristic is classified as alive.
The possibility of using lip movement analysis while uttering a given phrase
was tested in [13], focusing on the correlation between the assumed utterance and
the dynamics of the mouth movement. Due to their simplicity and feasibility of
implementation on mobile devices, methods based on analysis of the degree of eye
closure and smile were tested in this study.
The 3D analysis group includes Optical Flow analysis described in [3], where it
was noticed that the movement of objects can be divided into four types: rotation,
displacement, resizing and changing perspective. The first three types are common
to 2D and 3D objects, while the final type is specific only to 3D objects – thus,
analysis of such changes may allow us to detect attacks. The paper discussed the
idea of using light neural networks to classify Optical Flow maps. This method,
in conjunction with facial landmark detection, is also applied in [10]. It can be
assumed that as the face moves, different parts of the face move differently. The
model uses Gabor decomposition and an SVM classifier. This technique is also used
in the method proposed in [12]. However, there is a high probability of rejecting
a characteristic if it does not exhibit this kind of movement. In [28] a method has
been proposed to detect characteristic points of the face in several photos taken
from different angles, by forcing the user’s head to move appropriately. The clas-
sifier assesses whether the arrangement of points is characteristic of a real face or
whether it is an attack. This solution is independent of the user’s phone model and
environmental conditions, which has been proven by carrying out tests on several
databases. However, the proposed approach requires some user engagement.
One of the first publications on image texture and component analysis is [16],
where attacks involving a printed photo of a face using the Fourier transform are
detected. This solution is based on two observations: the real image contains more
high-frequency components than the false image, and even if the face is moving, the
standard deviation in successive frames remains small. With the development of
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printers and improvements in printing precision, this approach has become ineffec-
tive. The study of textures is a very popular and widely studied topic. In [4] and [18],
the possibility of using LBP in various variants in static images was checked. The
method consists in creating local histograms of differences in the values of neigh-
boring pixels, using a window with a predetermined size, for example 3× 3. It can
divide the image into blocks and perform separate operations, and then combine the
resulting histograms into one.
The solution proposed in [6] – Dynamic Textures – is an extension of LBP and is
based on the analysis of microtextures in time and space. The best results have been
obtained using a nonlinear SVM classifier. In [9] both solutions were tested – the
discrete two-dimensional Fourier transform and texture detection via LBP, achieving
the best results by combining these two methods. The research was conducted on
attacks using paper masks, but the method used only one static image at a time.
The computed values produced vectors that were used to train the SVM classifier.
With the development of machine learning, solutions based on convolutional neural
networks have emerged. An example of such a solution is [1], where one photo is
required, and the developed method involves non-linear blurring of the image in such
a way that the contours of the real face remain visible while the fake face disappears.
The prepared images are then classified by the convolutional neural network.
Dataset Date Number of Videos Number of People
NUAA 2010 (photos) 12 000 15
CASIA-FASD 2012 600 50
Replay-Attack 2012 1 200 50
MSU-USSA 2016 9 000 1 000
CASIA-SURF 2018 21 000 1 000
ROSE-Youtu 2018 3 350 20
Table 1. Comparison of datasets used for training and testing new attack detection solu-
tions
There is a group of solutions which combine several methods, often using addi-
tional sensors, for example image depth [17], light reflections at different frequencies,
or detection of the intensity of skin changes caused by blood flow [19, 17]. The re-
cently created CASIA-SURF [30] database contains images of 1 000 people’s faces
in visible light, infrared and a depth map. On its basis, several works [22, 29, 26]
have been published, with researchers reporting very high effectiveness. Different
neural network architectures were compared with the best results for combining the
three modalities. Unfortunately, such sensors are not widely available on mobile
devices. HOG-based methods (Histogram of Oriented Gradients) were also used.
In [14] information about the character’s surroundings is used and attack detection
is performed in a similar way to what an actual person would do – it points out if
someone is trying to cheat the system by holding, for example, a photo of the face.
In [7], a comprehensive solution using only RGB images was proposed, using
EfficientNet [27] networks and on MobileNetV2 [25], adding the last few layers in
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such a way as to obtain a binary classification result on the output. It was shown
that although the MobileNetV2-based model achieved slightly worse results, it also
required a smaller number of network parameters (267 thousand, compared to the
the EfficientNet-based model at over 5.5 million parameters), and therefore has
greater potential for use on mobile devices. The ROSE-Youtu [15] training set,
which was applied in this study, contains attempts of attacks by 20 people using both
paper printouts and masks, as well as reconstructed recordings. In [2] the authors
propose to combine two solutions. In the former (patch-based) random, small, local
facial characteristics were examined, increasing the amount of data to train the
model. The procedure enables the use of the full resolution of the characteristic
image, as opposed to the holistic approach, which often scales the image, and thus
forfeits some of its quality. The second aproach (depth-based) resulted in a method
for creating a comprehensive face depth map, assuming that a real face has more
depth than the flat characteristics used in attacks.
Several sets – CASIA-FASD [31], MSU-USSA [23] and Replay-Attack [4] – were
used, producing 2.67%, 0.35% and 0.79% EER (Equal Error Rate) respectively.
Table 1 compares the datasets used to detect attacks.
3 ASSESSMENT OF THE VIABILITY OF A BIOMETRIC
CHARACTERISTIC
In order to analyze the means of assessing the viability of a biometric characteristic,
various methods were tested in this study, both specific to facial biometrics and
enabling detection of attacks regardless of the biometric method used.
3.1 Assessment of Characteristic Viability on the Basis
of Facial Movement in Three-Dimensional Space
Due to the specificity of face recognition biometrics, methods involving analysis
of successive frames of the recording, in particular the movement of characteristic
points of the face, were proposed in this paper to assess the viability of the char-
acteristic. The implementation, number and exact location of points may vary, but
the most common ones include eyes, mouth and nose. The method proposed in this
work bases on the observation that the movement of the face in three-dimensional
space differs from the movement of a two-dimensional object, which is a photo of
a face printed or displayed on an electronic device. Evaluation of changes in the grid
of characteristic points can be performed by analyzing the distance measure. For
two matrices, A1 and A2, representing the distances between each two characteristic
points of the face, the distance is given by the formula:
M =
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For two identical grids of characteristic points, the value of the M distance
will be zero. The value increases along with an increase in differences between the
grids. In fact, lack of precision in detecting the characteristic points causes slight
changes in distance for meshes which retain similarity1, For example, by changing
the position in the frame, zooming and rotating it, the value will be close to zero.
Rotation of the head changes the position of the characteristic points in relation to
each other, which implies an increase in distance. Figure 1 shows the position of
the characteristic points of the face for two ranges of motion, taking into account
10 successive frames of the recording.
a) Minor head movements b) Significant head movements
Figure 1. Comparison of the relative coordinates of 131 characteristic points of the face.
The edge of the detected face is marked with a dashed line.
The NUAA Imposter DB2 was used to check the value of the distance for faces
that do not change position, as well as faces which exhibit movement. Each record-
ing in the database consists of a sequence of between several dozen and several
hundred frames, and within each sequence all frames show the same person. The
recordings contain presentation attacks involving various transformations of printed
photographs and sequences of real people. The attack set was divided into a part
which contains similarity transforms, and a part which involves changes in perspec-
tive and bending of the photo.
1 Similarity – a geometric transformation that maintains the ratio of the distance be-
tween points.
2 NUAA Imposter DB set – http://parnec.nuaa.edu.cn/xtan/data/
NUAAImposterDB.html
Assessment of the Viability of a Biometric Characteristic 175
Each photo was subjected to face detection and extraction of characteristic
points on a mobile device, resulting in a list of coordinates relative to the upper
left corner of the detected face. The Firebase ML Kit3 library was used for this
purpose. It enables the use of two characteristic point detection algorithms which
return 10 or 131 face characteristic points respectively.
a) b)
Figure 2. Photos of faces with 10 and 131 landmarks respectively
Figure 2 shows the points used in both methods. The positions of some facial
features (mainly the ears) which are not directly visible, were approximated. Their
positions in subsequent frames differ significantly, so only the remaining eight points
were used in further studies. Moreover, in the second drawing (131 points) poor pre-
cision of the facial contours can be observed. These contours are probably averaged
over existing points rather than independently detected.
To calculate the M distance for data from the NUAA database, both face char-
acteristic point detection algorithms from the Firebase ML Kit library were used.
For each frame in the sequence characteristic points of the face were generated. Sub-
sequently, a matrix of mutual distances between each pair of characteristic points
was computed. Following final transformations, based on the (1) formula, a distance
measure was obtained, expressed as a single numerical value.
Figure 3 presents the distance histograms according to the M distance for both
face characteristic point detection algorithms and two types of attacks: the first one
based solely on the similarity of still photos and the second one based on distortions
and projective transformations. Additionally, the movement distance was included
for real subjects. The lowest value of M corresponds to the distortion-free set, while
for attacks carried out with distortions and actual subjects very similar values were
obtained. Moreover, no significant differences were noticed between the algorithms
3 Firebase ML Kit library – https://firebase.google.com/docs/ml-kit/
detect-faces
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for detecting characteristic points of the face; thus, further analyses involved the
algorithm which returns fewer points.




















Attack - similarity transformations
Attack - changes in perspective 
and bends in photography
Real face movements
a) 8 points


















Attack - similarity transformations
Attack - changes in perspective 
and bends in photography
Real face movements
b) 131 points
Figure 3. Histogram showing the M distance for the NUAA set for two face characteristic
point detection algorithms
Based on the above distance measure, the theoretical classification abilities of
the logistic regression model to distinguish attacks from real subjects were tested.
Figure 4 a) shows the ROC curve (Receiver Operating Characteristic). It takes into
account the relationship between FPR4 and TPR5 The expected ROC curve should
be more convex and the surface area beneath it as large as possible. In this case, the
4 FPR (False Positive Rate) – the percentage of wrong confirmations
5 TPR (True Positive Rate) – sensitivity or true positive percentage
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ROC curve shows that only presentation attacks in which there is no facial movement
can be detected relatively well. Unfortunately, for this collection, the differences in
the movement of the characteristic points of real people’s faces in relation to the
distortions of photographs are too small to be able to clearly separate the classes
from each other.
Due to the lack of unambiguous results assessing the effectiveness of the distance
and the shortage of data sets of appropriate size and quality, which would include
significant facial movement within one sequence of photos, it was decided to use
a data set not specialized for this purpose. The YouTube Faces database6 containing
recordings of 1 595 different people (over 600 000 photos) was used. In order to divide
the set into sequences containing significant movement and those containing slight
movement, each photo in the sequence was analyzed for facial rotation. The FSA-
NET7 was used to assess the face rotation angle, resulting in a three-dimensional
face rotation vector. The threshold for considering facial movement as significant
was approximated based on the previously described NUAA dataset, which also
assessed the facial rotation angle.
Table 2 presents statistics of the NUAA set for attacks using similarity-based
transformations. It has been shown that changes in position in relation to the X
and Y axes are relatively small and most do not exceed 7° along any of the axes.
The X axis corresponds to the absolute value of face rotation vertically, while the
Y axis corresponds to horizontal rotation.
Face rotation angle for the NUAA set
X axis Y axis
Average 1.97 2.29




Table 2. Changes in the angle of face rotation for the NUAA dataset
Due to the small characteristic size, frames with a minimum 10° change in the
face rotation angle were included in the distinct movement collection. Sequences
where movement fell below this value were treated as attack simulations, reflecting
the instability and imprecision of facial landmark detection models.
Table 3 summarizes the ROC curve parameters for the logistic regression clas-
sifier. Its graph is shown in Figure 4 b). The most significant movement (at least
10° along the X and Y axes) corresponded to the highest average distance values
and therefore the best separation between this set and the set where there was no
significant movement. For this reason, the EER error was the smallest for this class,
equalling 4.99%. It follows that the combination of facial movement along two axes
6 YouTube Faces database – https://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~wolf/ytfaces/
7 FSA-NET network – https://github.com/shamangary/FSA-Net
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Attack - similarity transformations
Attack - changes in perspective and bends in photography
a) NUAA dataset










Significant movement in the X axis
Significant movement in the Y axis
Significant movement in the X and Y axes
b) YT Faces dataset
Figure 4. ROC curves for NUAA and YT Faces datasets
may be the best indicator of the viability of the characteristic, but may also be the
least convenient for the user to perform. Figure 5 presents a histogram showing the
M distance values for the YT Faces set.
X Axis Movements Y Axis Movements X&Y Axes Movements
EER 19.17% 9.08% 4.99%
AUC8 0.88 0.97 0.99
Table 3. Efficiency of classification using logistic regression
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Significant movement in the X axis
Significant movement in the Y axis
Significant movement in the X and Y axes
Figure 5. Histogram showing the M distance for the YT Faces set
3.2 Simulating Face Movement by Changing Perspective
Facial movement can also be simulated by changing the perspective under which
the 2D characteristic is presented, thus simulating facial rotation. In order to create
a model capable of recognizing such attacks a new set of sequences was generated
providing it is a faithful representation of real-world attacks. For this purpose, the
Facescrub9 collection was used [20]. For each subject, on the basis of their single
photo and projective transformation, new images were created, imitating changes in
the angle at which the false characteristic is presented. Each photo was transformed
along the X axis, Y axis and both axes simultaneously. The corresponding edges
of the photo were enlarged in one of three scales: 120%, 160% and 200%. An ex-
ample of a Y-axis transformation simulating horizontal face rotation is presented in
Figure 6.
The effectiveness of face detection was checked along with its characteristic
points depending on the degree of transformation. Results are presented in Ta-
ble 4. It can be seen that as the degree of transformation increases, the effectiveness
of face detection decreases. Moreover, for such transformations the angle of face
rotation predicted by the FSA-NET network was also checked. As the degree of
transformation increases, the projected angle of rotation increases. The M distance
value for the original photo and the generated transformation was analyzed, with
the corresponding histograms presented in Figure 7. Results indicate that the dis-
tance value may exceed the value obtained when comparing faces under natural
movement.
Additionally, the similarity of the transformed photos to the originals was check-
ed by applying the previously described facial recognition model. Figure 8 presents
9 Facescrub DB set – http://vintage.winklerbros.net/facescrub.html








Figure 6. An example of a generated sequence simulating an attack using a face photo
perspective change
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c) X and Y axes








Axis Scale [%] X Y
120 1.16 3.15 0.029 98.24
X 160 4.50 2.52 0.065 96.11
200 7.16 2.89 0.080 79.53
120 2.22 3.04 0.022 98.86
Y 160 1.80 6.64 0.068 93.58
200 2.58 9.51 0.095 78.19
120 1.93 1.70 0.029 98.80
X/Y 160 7.39 5.96 0.071 92.12
200 16.75 15.74 0.144 14.64
Table 4. Comparison of rotation angle, average distance value, and face detection accuracy
for different projective transforms
the statistical distribution of the cosine distance between the compared characteris-
tics. It is evident that as the transformation scale increases, the distance and thus
similarity both decrease. Nevertheless, for the previously determined threshold, the
vast majority of characteristics are still positively classified. This means that the
facial recognition module is not very sensitive to changes of perspective under which
a potential false characteristic is presented, but this has a significant impact on the
selection of the method for assessing the viability of the characteristic.
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Figure 8. Histograms showing the value of the cosine distance between the original pho-
tograph and the projective transformation at different scales and axes
3.3 Classification of the Movement of Characteristic Points
of the Face Using Machine Learning Techniques
A high M distance value is not sufficient as an indicator of the viability of a given
characteristic. It only reveals the magnitude of changes in between two sets of facial
landmarks. The greater the distance value, the more significant the facial movement,
but it is not known whether this is caused by actual changes in the appearance of
the subject or merely by distortions and changes in perspective. The corresponding
assessment can be performed through more detailed analysis of the movement of
characteristic points of the face, using machine learning methods. The previously
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generated projective transformations and sequences from the YT Faces database
were used to classify the face of a real subject and to attack the presentation. In-
stead of calculating a one-dimensional distance value, a matrix of differences in the
distance of characteristic points of the face was used to classify the movement. Four
machine learning models from the scikit-learn10 library were tested: two support
vector machines (LinearSVC and SVC with rbf kernel), GaussianNaiveBayes algo-
rithm, and the multilayer perceptron MultiLayerPerceptron. Classification accuracy
was checked using the above models for two distance ranges, which may correspond
to two scales of projective transformations (120% and 160% respectively). Per-
centage values were determined arbitrarily in the course of experiments and while
they were not adjusted to distance ranges, they nevertheless correspond to them
with high accuracy. Face detection accuracy dropped dramatically following 200%
projective transformation, and the accuracy of detecting attacks was very high; thus
a realistic attack is regarded as unlikely.
Results are presented in Table 5. The best results were obtained for a nonlinear
support vector machine. It has been shown that classification accuracy increases
along with distance and thus with the scope of transformations. It is therefore easier
to detect simulation of motion through perspective changes if the angle at which the
characteristics are presented is larger. Therefore, classification should be performed
only after exceeding a certain distance value (in this case – 0.05). Movement of the
subject’s face will therefore have to be significant enough to exceed the predefined
threshold, permitting accurate analysis.
Classifier
Accuracy
M ∈ (0.01; 0.05) M ∈ (0.05; 0.1)
Linear SVM 85.19% 90.03%
Nonlinear SVM 90.76% 96.90%
Naive Bayes Classifier 85.14% 86.61%
Multilayer Perceptron 85.37% 95.28%
Table 5. Classification performance using different machine learning methods for different
M distance values
3.4 Classification of Face Movement Using Optical Flow
and Mobile Neural Networks
Classification of facial motion by detecting movement of characteristic points of the
face requires the user to perform considerable movement with their head. However,
for practical reasons, it is advisable to minimize such movement. For this reason, the
applicability of a method based on Optical Flow maps was tested. This technique
can be used to detect the direction of movement of objects between successive frames
10 Scikit-learn – https://scikit-learn.org/stable/
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in a video sequence. In this work, classification is done through a neural network,
without assuming any particular motion model.
The data used to train neural networks came from the previously mentioned
NUAA Imposter DB database. The Farneback algorithm from the OpenCV li-
brary was used to create Optical Flow maps. Among the algorithm’s parameters
there is the size of the analyzed window within which motion is sought. Window
sizes of 10, 15 and 20 pixels were checked. For each pixel, the value and direction
of movement are calculated. These values are converted to the HSV color space
and then to RGB. Modified EfficientNet neural networks were used for classifica-
tion. Dropout and Softmax layers were added to the base. Learning accuracy was
checked using Transfer Learning (trained networks on ImageNet) and teaching the
networks from scratch. Color pictures with dimensions of 224 × 224 formed the
input to the network. 10-fold cross-validation was used to evaluate the effective-
ness of neural network learning. Sequences from the initial set were divided into
10 disjoint parts. Nine of these comprised the training set and one formed the test
set. The learning process was repeated ten times, with a different part used as the
test set each time. Finally, the average learning success rate for the test set was
measured.
Regardless of the value of the window, training the model from scratch was
more effective. Moreover, the highest classification efficiency occurs for a window
size of 15. Therefore, this value was chosen for further analysis.
In addition, in order to increase the amount and diversity of data, less popu-
lar data sets were also used: the BioID11, which contains 1 521 photos of 23 sub-
jects, and Kaggle DeepFake12 from which 3 310 10-frame sequences were obtained.
The attack collection was also expanded with Optical Flow maps generated on
the basis of 40 customized videos displayed on the monitor. Increasing the size
of the training sets resulted in increased stability of classification and enabled
the authors to forgo cross-validation. Sequences from the initial set were split
into 90/10 subsets, with 90% of data forming the training set and the remain-
ing 10% used as the test set. The effectiveness of classification was checked both
with the use of Transfer Learning and by training the network from scratch. As
before, classification efficiency turned out to be better for networks trained from
scratch.
Table 6 summarizes the effectiveness of classification for different variants of
network training. Although training a network from scratch increases the required
time, it does not affect the response time of the model on a mobile device. More
important is the effectiveness of classification, which turned out to be higher when
the network was trained from scratch – which is why this neural network model was
used for further tests on mobile devices.
11 BioId database – https://www.bioid.com/facedb/
12 Kaggle DeepFake DB – https://www.kaggle.com/c/
deepfake-detection-challenge
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Dataset
Accuracy
Transfer Learning Without Transfer Learning
NUAA (window = 10) 83.85% 95.55%
NUAA (window = 15) 87.46% 95.55%




Table 6. Effectiveness of classification of Optical Flow maps of the EfficientNet network
using Transfer Learning and training the network from scratch
4 EVALUATION
For practical analysis of the issue of assessing the viability of a biometric character-
istic, we have developed a dedicated mobile application used in experiments. Models
whose training is described in the previous chapter have been used.
4.1 Implementation
User authentication consists of the facial recognition process and the characteristic
viability evaluation process. In a dedicated mobile application the user can choose
a specific method of assessing the viability of the characteristic:
• method based on the analysis of the movement of characteristic points of the
face (1);
• Optical Flow method using vertical or horizontal face rotation (2);
• Optical Flow method which involves bringing the lens closer to the face (3);
• method based on blink and smile detection (4).
In addition to a real-time preview of the camera image, the user’s screen displays
a message highlighting the need to perform a given action. Depending on the se-
lected characteristic viability evaluation mode, the screen may also show additional
information in graphic form, e.g. detected facial markings or indicators showing the
angle of face rotation. The process of acquiring a face photo is automated. After
analyzing a given frame, a decision is made whether the requested action has been
successfully performed by the user. Upon acceptance, the frame is remembered and
the status of the authentication process is updated. A corresponding message is
also displayed to the user on the screen. After performing all actions, the collected
frames are analyzed by the characteristic viability detection module and the face
recognition module.
In the method based on the movement of characteristic points of the face (1), the
user must perform any face rotation, e.g. a rotation to the right. Each frame of the
recording is analyzed and the face is detected, followed by its characteristic points.
A list of the most recent 10 frames is kept. For each pair of consecutive frames
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Attempt








1 69.49 11.35 9.44
2 45.91 17.21 2.69
3 51.44 11.31 19.05
4 29.41 5.31 5.79
5 56.81 8.38 2.60
6 78.64 24.15 7.43
7 51.58 7.95 6.67
8 25.05 7.89 22.54
9 21.49 11.81 3.64
10 63.08 18.48 11.08
Average 49.29 12.38 9.09
Table 7. Characteristic authenticity prediction – method based on changing the distance
from the tested object
containing facial landmarks, the distance is calculated according to the M distance
formula (described in the previous section). If the value of the metric exceeds
0.05 for at least 10 pairs of frames, classification is performed. The decision to
accept a characteristic is made by the two classifiers which exhibit the best training
efficiency, i.e. the nonlinear classifier SVM and the multilayer perceptron MLP.
The classifiers were trained in Python using the scikit-learn library and converted
using the sklearn-porter 13. Appropriate parameters necessary for initialization of
classifiers are saved in the json format and loaded from the device’s internal memory.
A characteristic is classified positively if the mean value returned by both classifiers
is positive (> 50%).
For the method involving rotation of the face (2), the selection of appropriate
frames used to create Optical Flow maps is performed by analyzing the face rotation
angle. Depending on the selected mode, the Firebase ML Kit library is used to
analyze the horizontal rotation angle, or dlib together with the OpenCV library
to detect the vertical rotation angle. The rotation angle is analyzed in real time.
A point indicator is displayed on the user’s screen, showing the current degree of
facial rotation, along with four target points. The points are arranged in a straight
line vertically or horizontally, depending on the selected mode – two per side. By
rotating the face, the user changes the position of the pointer. If it reaches the
indicated target point, the frame is saved. After completing the task, Optical Flow
maps are computed between frames using the OpenCV library. Subsequently, they
are classified by the EfficientNet mobile neural network in tflite format using the
TensorFlow Lite library. If the average of all images is above the set threshold, the
viability test is accepted.
13 sklearn-porter library – https://github.com/nok/sklearn-porter
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1 72.85 43.84 27.00
2 43.55 51.30 23.29
3 55.66 13.60 35.91
4 43.12 54.39 9.45
5 77.12 9.47 23.27
6 21.32 24.10 18.95
7 68.72 22.59 38.78
8 68.97 44.94 46.04
9 46.31 43.60 26.69
10 79.49 22.20 40.98
Average 57.71 33.03 29.04
Table 8. Characteristic authenticity prediction – method based on horizontal face rotation
In order to minimize the need to rotate the face while ensuring that movement
is registered between each two frames of the recording, the classification capabilities
of Optical Flow maps were tested using the natural vibrations of the user’s hand,
perspective changes in the process of zooming in and out, and involuntary changes
in facial expressions (3). On the device screen the currently detected face is marked
with a frame, with rectangles depictng two target frames – a smaller one and a larger
one. The larger square takes up approx. 80% of the screen width, while the smaller
square takes up approx. 60%. The user’s task is to move the mobile device in such
a way that the detected face is inside the smaller and outside the larger rectangle
respectively. Once the requirements are met, the frames are saved for further anal-
ysis. In total, three frames are obtained in this method - one with the face fitting
inside the smaller rectangle, the second when the face protrudes beyond the larger
rectangle, and the third in between. An Optical Flow map is computed for each pair
of consecutive frames and then classified in the same way as for the facial rotation
method.
Contrary to the previous methods, which require face rotation or close-up,
method (4) analyzes changes in facial expressions. The user is asked to blink first
and then to smile. Detection of these activities is performed using the Firebase ML
Kit library, which assesses the likelihood of a blink and of a smile for each eye. If
an action occurs in the analyzed frame, it is saved for further analysis. Appropriate
information about the required next action is displayed at the top of the screen.
4.2 Experiments
For each method of assessing the viability of a characteristic and the type of attack,
10 measurements were performed. Table 7 presents the characteristic authenticity
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Characteristic Authenticity Prediction [%]
Genuine Characteristic
Characteristic Printed












Table 9. Characteristic authenticity prediction – method based on the vertical face rota-
tion
assessment for the method based on changes in distance from the tested object.
The greater the value, the higher the likelihood that the characteristic is genuine,
while lower values suggest an attempted attack. It can be seen that the attacks
obtained a much lower mean value than real characteristics, which confirms the
statistical effectiveness of the model. However, the tendency of the model to reduce
the likelihood that the characteristic is authentic can also be noticed.
Table 8 shows the results of characteristic authenticity prediction for the hori-
zontal face rotation method. The mean value for all three test modes turned out to
be greater than for the method based on changes in distance from the test object.
In this case, facial movement was more significant, suggesting greater authenticity
of the characteristic. In addition, the true characteristic has a greater authenticity
estimate than the corresponding attack attempts. Unfortunately, in some cases the
authenticity estimate of the counterfeit characteristic is greater than that of the
genuine characteristic.
The characteristic authenticity prediction for the vertical face rotation method
is shown in Table 9. The test was performed only for the real characteristic and
for an attack which exploits a printed photograph. It was not possible to perform
tests on an electronic device in this form. The vertical face rotation angle evaluation
algorithm used on a mobile device turned out to be unable to detect faces merely
via changes in perspective. The flexible nature of paper, however, allowed for more
extensive manipulation and enabled a successful initial test. Paradoxically, this
turns out to be an effective test of the authenticity of a characteristic displayed on
a mobile device.
The characteristic authenticity prediction for the method based on blink and
smile detection is shown in Table 10. The attack could not be successfully performed
with a single face image, therefore only the true characteristic is included in this
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Table 10. Characteristic authenticity prediction – method based on blink and smile de-
tection
table. The reported values turned out to be the highest among all methods, which
suggests that changes in facial expressions are the most significant for the method
using Optical Flow maps. In all cases, both a face with closed eyes and a smiling
face were correctly identified.
Assessment of characteristic authenticity for a method based on analysis of the
movement of characteristic points of the face, using the SVM classifier and the
MLP classifier, is presented in Table 11. As can be seen, in most cases the classifiers
returned results which were definitive, but divergent from each other.
Attempt








SVM MLP SVM MLP SVM MLP
1 60 80 0 0 0 0
2 100 100 0 0 0 40
3 100 100 20 20 0 0
4 100 100 0 0 0 0
5 100 100 0 100 10 20
6 0 100 0 0 0 0
7 100 100 10 10 0 0
8 100 100 0 0 0 0
9 100 100 80 60 10 20
10 100 100 40 30 0 0
Average 86 98 15 22 2 8
Table 11. Characteristic authenticity prediction – method based on the analysis of facial
landmark movements
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Table 12. Summary of accuracy of characteristic authenticity prediction for all tested
methods
A summary of the performance of all tested methods is presented in Table 12.
The effectiveness with which the authenticity of a real characteristic is confirmed and
false characteristics detected was calculated under the assumption that for methods
based on Optical Flow, the input is considered genuine if the average value is at least
50%. In turn, for the method based on the analysis of the movement of characteristic
points of the face, the average value returned by both classifiers, i.e. SVM and MLP,
must be at least 0.5. All tested methods showed good effectiveness. Assuming that
only one photo of the face is used for the attack, the most effective method involved
detection of blinks and smiles. Presentation attacks cannot be carried out without
photo manipulation. In this method, the use of Optical Flow maps does not yield
any additional benefits, but can be applied when an attack exploits a paper mask
with cutouts for the mouth and eyes.
5 CONCLUSION
In this work we focused on the issue of assessing the viability of a biometric char-
acteristic on a mobile device – focusing on the possibility of using machine learning
models to assess the authenticity of such a characteristic. For this purpose, we
analyzed the effectiveness of detecting the viability of a biometric characteristic
during attacks using a single photograph of the subject’s face. Our analysis and
experiments indicate that the effectiveness of assessment is largely influenced by
the hardware properties of mobile devices. On the one hand, such devices have
various types of sensors that can be used to assess the viability of a biometric char-
acteristic; however, on the other hand, limited hardware resources (such as memory,
CPU power or screen space) may affect the convenience and efficiency with which
biometric characteristic viability assessment is performed, especially using complex
machine learning algorithms. As a result of the presented tests, we concluded that
the most effective method of assessing the viability of a biometric characteristic is
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the one which involves blink and smile detection. However, each of the analyzed
methods (including the most effective one) was susceptible – to some extent – to
attack. Foolproof attack detection and unquestionable assessment of the viability of
a biometric characteristic are impossible to achieve; however, any proposed method
used should be accurate enough to effectively discourage potential attack attempts.
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